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# Insecurity, Victimhood, Self and Other: The Case of Israel and Palestine

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Insecurity is not a *terra incognita* in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a space often visited by many members of both societies. Jews and Palestinian alike are more than visitors to this space; they are permanent inhabitants of it. It is a kind of Lunatic Park where you can choose your favourite site. The most popular one seems to be the basest and ugliest site of them all, the one that opens a direct and unmitigated channel from the land of fear to the land of hate – the fear of the 'Other'. The Other in this context is constructed as the very antithesis of a strictly defined national self. In the particular case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, otherness not only raises questions of identity but also of history and legitimacy.

The following is a schematic overview of the process by which the construction of Israeli-Jewish national identity and the institutionalization of a particular hegemonic discourse in social and popular culture entailed the constitution of a Palestinian/Arab self as its demonized 'other'. Since the connections between the history of Zionism and the formation of Israeli national identity have been amply discussed elsewhere, I will focus on the implications of presenting Arab identity as the Other of the Israeli-Jewish national identity for potential reconciliation in contemporary Israeli society.[1] For this purpose I will explore the relationship between victimhood, justice and the ongoing conflict until today. In the process, I will also argue that from today's perspective, the rootedness of this discourse of otherness and its prevalence in Israeli-Jewish popular culture is forming a key obstacle to a just and equitable solution to the current conflict.

## Fear, victimhood and otherness

The suppression of difference and the construction of an Other are critical to the imposition of a hegemonic national identity. In the particular case of Israel, this formulation took on an added significance that was painfully exposed in the early 1950s. Beginning in the nineteenth century, and elaborated upon much more significantly following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Arab identity came to be constructed as the 'hated other', of Israeli-Jewish national identity, symbolizing

everything that Jewishness was not. This juxtaposition ran into trouble when Israel encouraged about one million Arab Jews to immigrate. There was a conscious effort to de-Arabize these Arabs immigrants: they were taught to scorn their mother tongue, reject Arab culture and make an effort to be Europeanized.[2]

This approach to identity, that is of constructing an Other as the negative pole of oneself, was further reinforced through Israeli historiography specifically in the ways it dealt with Jewish terrorism in the Mandatory period or with Jewish atrocities in the 1948 war. Given that terrorism is a mode of behaviour that Israeli Orientalists attribute solely to the Palestinian resistance movement, it could not be part of an analysis or description of chapters in Israel's past. One way out of this conundrum was to accredit a particular political group, preferably an extremist one, with the same attributes of the enemy, while exonerating mainstream national behaviour. As such, Israeli historians and Israeli society at large were able to admit to the massacre in Dir Yassin, committed by the right wing Irgun, but covered up or denied other massacres carried out by the Hagana – the main Jewish underground from which the future Israel Defence Forces was formed.[3]

In the same vein, this dilemma is further exemplified in the Israeli treatment of the issue of victimhood especially in the light of current events. Acknowledging the Other's victimhood, or much more than that, recognizing yourself as the victimizer of the Other is the most frightening ghost train one can embark upon. Until recently, most Israeli Jews have been unable, or simply refused, to entertain such ideas. As I have argued elsewhere, the Israeli TV series, *Tekkuma*, celebrating Israel's jubilee in 1998, was the first popular attempt to ponder the possibility that Jews were not only the ultimate victims of the twentieth century but also its victimizers. This was done by allocating space on TV to propose another possible narrative of the history of Palestine. Although this was a very cautious attempt, which did not deviate too much from the dominant Zionist narrative, it was enough to cause a massive outcry throughout Israeli society and from all the political parties against the series' editors and producers.[4]

My contention here *is that* acknowledging the atrocities committed against the native inhabitants of Mandate Palestine, and which led to the eventual formation of modern Israel, is a vital and necessary station in the socialization of the Jews in Israel, no less, than the horror destinations, to which high school children in Israel are forced – and one hopes that at least some of them seek – to visit in Holocaust Europe. This process that is the acknowledgement of the Other as a victim, and which requires two very different references on both sides, has been absent both in the Israeli and the Palestinian attitudes. In both instances, but for similar reasons, there has been a profound resistance to this move.

For the Israeli Jews, recognizing the Palestinians as victims of Israeli actions is deeply traumatic. This form of acknowledgement, which recognizes the injustice involved in the death and displacement of the land's native inhabitants, not only questions the very foundational myths of the state of Israel and its motto of 'a land without a people for a people without a land' but also raises a panoply of ethical questions with significant implications for the future of the state. In other words, this fear of recognition is deeply rooted in the Israeli-Jewish perception of what had happened in 1948, the year Israel

was founded as independent nation state on part of mandate Palestine and where, according to mainstream and popular Israeli historiography, early Zionists settled an empty land making 'the desert bloom'. Here, this fear of recognition is also profoundly connected to one of the founding myths of Israeli society: that of David fighting the Goliath in a hostile environment. More importantly, the inability to acknowledge Palestinian trauma is also vitally connected to the manner in which the Palestinian narrative tells the story of that year, the year of the *Nakbah* (Catastrophe) in the Palestinian national narrative where the loss of lives and homes continue to be lived. Had this victimhood been related to the natural and normal consequences of a long lasting bloody conflict, Israeli-Jewish fears from allowing other side to become a victim of the conflict would not have been so fierce. From such a perspective, both sides would have been victims of 'the circumstances' or any other amorphous, non-committal concept which absolves human beings and particularly politicians from taking responsibility. But what the Palestinians are demanding and which in fact has become a *condition sine qua non* to many of them – but not of course to the present leadership of the Palestinian authority – is that the Palestinians be recognized as the victims of an Israeli evil. Losing the status of victimhood in this instance has both political implications on an international scale but more critically existential repercussions for Israeli-Jewish psyche. It implies recognizing that they had become a mirror image of their worst nightmare.

As for the Palestinians, recognizing the Israelis as victims implies not only acknowledgement of the Israeli Jews as a community of suffering whose victimization by European, namely German, evil does not justify victimizing the Palestinians but may explain a chain of victimization that would lead to a decrease in Holocaust denial on the Palestinian side. Palestinian reluctance to fully acknowledge the Holocaust and its importance in the constitution of an Israeli-Jewish psyche stems from a fear of sympathizing with the Other's suffering, after years of demonizing and degrading this Other while portraying the self as the Other's victim.

This fear of mutual recognition becomes more acute and is more critically articulated in public discourse in times of 'peace', for which such recognition is in fact a prerequisite. This became manifestly evident with the launching of the Oslo 'peace process' which even though was marketed as a reconciliation process, was in fact, as Naom Chomsky argues, nothing more than 'a military rearrangement of life than a genuine reconciliation' concluded by pragmatic political elites.[5] However, the very representation of that process as peace was enough to arouse the fears associated with the victimization of the Other and the vilification of the self. This will become more evident shortly.

## History: Invisible and indivisible

In the imbalance between Palestinians and Israelis this last twin process of Other-victimization and self-vilification is dreaded more on the Jewish Israeli side. It requires recognition of the Palestinians as the victims of Israeli deeds, and not as most Israeli

scholars, even of the Zionist Left, would put it down to circumstances.[6] Educators, historians, novelists and cultural producers in general, have willingly employed this discourse of ultimate and exclusive victimization, thus voluntarily contributing to this misrepresentation of historical processes. They all in one way or another helped to construct and preserve the national narrative, ethos and myths of Israeli society during times of war, or warlike times. This approach manifests itself in the tales told by child minders on Independence day and Passover; in the curriculum and text books in elementary and high schools; in the ceremonies of freshmen and the graduation of officers in the army; in the historical narrative carried in the printed and electronic media as well as in the speeches and discourse of the politicians; in the way artists, novelists and poets subject their works to the national narrative; and in the research produced by academics in the universities about Israeli reality in the past and the present.[7]

Liberal Zionists in Israel also adopt this particular posture. For them, peace and reconciliation translate into the need for mutual recognition between the Israeli and Palestinian national narratives, and the way to achieve this goal is to make divisible everything that is visible: land, resources, blame and history into a pre-1967 when we the Jews were Right and Just and a post-1967 when You the Palestinian are Right and Just. In other words, while the events which preceded and led to the foundation of modern Israel in 1948 not only remain unquestioned but in fact are justified, those following 1967 and the continued Israeli occupation of the territories conquered during this period (that is the West Bank and Gaza) are deemed unacceptable.

Viewed from this perspective, victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can also be divided into those two historical periods. This same approach of the Israeli-Jewish liberal camp is then applied to the history of the conflict. Jews are the victims of the earlier and more distant chapter in the history of the conflict, namely the pre-1967 era while Palestinians are the victims of its more recent chapter, post 1967. The periodization is very important since the earlier period is considered to be the more important one; and thus being just then, in the formative period of the conflict, justifies the existence of Zionism and the whole Jewish project in Palestine. At the same time, it also doubts the wisdom and morality of Palestinian actions in that period, questioning their national narratives and implicitly their 'rights'. Even though Zionism may have 'misbehaved' in subsequent times, its actions do not cast doubt on its very essence and justification.

However, peace and mutual recognition entail bridging over the invisible, hence the indivisible, layers of history, guilt and injustice. Blame cannot be divided, not if peace and reconciliation mean respect for the Other's narrative. The Palestinian narrative is that of suffering, reconstructed on the basis of living memory, oral history, a continued exilic existence and the more tangible effects such as property deeds, faded photographs and keys to homes they can no longer return to. These historical narratives are read backwards through the prism of contemporary hardships, in the occupied territories where residents are subjected daily to house demolitions, sudden arrests, expulsions and more recently to daily atrocities committed by the Israeli army; and in exile, where they are subjected to the whims of their host countries and in some instances denied

even their most basic civic and human rights. Through this prism, Zionism, or Israel, has come to represent absolute evil and the ultimate victimizer. How can this image be divided in the businesslike approach to peace, preached by American and Israeli peacemakers?

It cannot of course. When peace is discussed in such a context, one should appeal to ways in which communities of suffering, worldwide, reconcile with their victimizers. The narrative of suffering is an interpretative construct describing a collective evil in the past, often employed for the political needs of a given community in the present, in order to improve its conditions in the future. In order to avoid a reductionist view of the narrative of suffering, I will add that in the case of the Palestinians especially, as well as other communities which continue to live the aftereffects of the original action, this narrative also has a redemptive value – for the communities themselves. However, and as the case of the Holocaust has shown, the way this narrative is manipulated by cultural production and political actors for political ends is another issue which I will not discuss here.

In most contexts, this narrative is reproduced with the help of educational and media systems, a commemorative infrastructure of museums and ceremonies, and is preserved through a variety of discourses.[8] Even though it can serve a community in conflict, it is more difficult as means for reconciliation.[9] In the case of the Palestinians, living under occupation or in exile, commemoration takes on myriad, and sometimes unexpected, forms. Lacking the basic infrastructure, and in the absence of a *terra firma* on which to establish these rituals, commemoration takes form in the Occupied Territories most explicitly in crowding the calendar with significant days that have to be commemorated: days such the Balfour Declaration, the Declaration of Independence, the End of the Mandate, the Partition Resolution and the day of *Fatah*'s (the Palestinian Liberation Organization) foundation. In exile and often lacking the political, economic and civic rights necessary, retelling the narrative takes on its own local colour. In Lebanon for example, where the Palestinian presence is viewed as a serious threat to the country's sectarian balance, and hence long term political stability, the mass graveyard of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, where 2,000 residents of the camp were massacred following the 1982 Israeli invasion by right-wing members of a Lebanese militia under the watchful eye and protection of the Israeli army, has been used as a massive garbage dump for the past eighteen years. Every year it is cleared up in September, but it usually takes activists from outside the camp to generate some memorial event before it disintegrates into a dump again. More recently, children in these same camps have transformed the commemoration of the *Nakbah* through a re-telling of their own personal narratives and imaginative re-constitutions of the Palestine they wish to return to. In another exilic community in Tunis, a group of Palestinian activists transformed their private living rooms between 1983 and 1993 into live museums of the catastrophe, which had befallen their people. In each living room, a small corner was set up representing their own narrative and discourse of national identity. In yet another example, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Palestinians and others have come together in recent years on 13 December, the anniversary of the first *intifada* to relay their own personal stories.

At times of conflict, suffering and victimhood become a most significant element in constituting collective identity as well as destroying the collective memory of the Other. The negation of the Other, his or her suffering and catastrophes, is a constitutive element in shaping national identities.[10] Violence and Fear are therefore important factors in constructing collective memories, in their reproductions, dissemination and inclusion or exclusion in or from a given historical reality and balance of power. Or, to be more precise the above assertion applies mainly in situations of conflict over the definition of identity in a given territorial entity as well as over definition of the territory itself – in other contexts, this is not necessarily the case.

In the case of Israel and Palestine, controlling the collective memory of both groups is part of the violent and existential struggle for national survival. The effort to shape collective memory is therefore a dialectical process motivated by the fear of the Other and the wish to negate it. Part of this process is a complete takeover of the victim's status, enjoyed by the other side, and the negation of its suffering. Recognizing the other side as a victim of your actions is part of the healing or reconciliation process.

Fear therefore plays a motivating role in the violence exercised daily in the struggle over narrative, memory and victimhood. Victimizing the Other and negating its right for the position of a victim are intertwined processes of the same violence. Those who expelled Palestinians in 1948 deny the ethnic cleansing that took place. An ethnic cleansing that included the destruction of more than 500 villages, city neighbourhoods, the expulsion of almost a million people and the massacring of thousands.[11] And so the self-declaration of being a victim is accompanied by the fear of losing the position of the Jew as the ultimate victim in modern history.

## Fear, justice and retribution

What is the essence of that Israeli fear? The most difficult part of it is the need to recognize the cardinal role the Jewish State played in making the Palestinians into a community of suffering. The next step would be to consider the means to accept the implications of such a step. How can it be done?

I will suggest here three possible ways, out of probably many others through which the violent element in the relationship between the two communities can be extricated. I looked in a comparative way for guidance and advice in the realm of civic and international law, sociological theories of retribution and restitution and finally cultural studies so as to better articulate the dialectical relationship between collective memories and their manipulation.

The very idea of considering the 1948 case in the realm of law and justice is an anathema to most Jews in Israel. In fact, this mere suggestion would sow panic and horror amidst this particular community. However, I do believe that to achieve some form of actual reconciliation, this step has to be taken. What would most frighten Jewish society in Israel in the very association of its past conduct with such procedures and theories is the probable implication and inclusion of some of its members in the category of war criminals. When hearing for the first time about the 1948 massacre committed by Jewish soldiers in the Palestinian village of Tantura, the Israeli philosopher Asa

Kasher declared that the perpetrators should be regarded as war criminals.[12] Tantura, however, was not the only massacre and certainly not the worst of them all.

But Kasher was unique in his response. Veterans of the Israeli unit participating in the Tanatura massacre have sued for libel the researcher in whose MA thesis the massacre is described. Similarly, any reference in the Israeli press to expulsion, massacre or destruction is usually denied and attributed to self-hate and service to the enemy in time of war.[13] This reaction includes members of academia, the media and the educational system as well as most political circles. These reactions reveal the depth of the fear that pervades Israeli society that some of its members may be implicated in actions the likes of which have been condemned by the entire world, including prominent members of Israeli society.

So one can see how such associations and insinuations antagonize visually and acoustically many Jews in Israel and how little is the incentive to ride that ghost train in the land of fear back to the past. Given the present imbalance of power between the Palestinians and the Israelis, where the Israeli government effectively controls territorial access as well as all vital resources, any potential incentive to face up to this past diminishes considerably. To assess how frightening such an experience might be for Israeli-Jewish society, we can attempt to conjure up the possible media treatment of Israeli past conduct. Let us imagine the debate or treatment of such a case on Television or Radio. In the end of the previous century, the Public TV channel in America (PBS) recorded a new series of chapters in an excellent programme called 'Inside the Law', which takes place on the premises of the Law school at New York University (NYU). Those new chapters were devoted to 'Justice, Restitution and Reconciliation in a Violent World'. The first chapter in this series dealt with litigation arising from genocide and other crimes against humanity: the Holocaust and beyond. It recognized the *sui generis* status of the Holocaust compared to other atrocities. However, when it broke down such horrors into the distinct ingredients of which destruction in such contexts was comprised: social fabric, careers, culture, real estate and so on, it put these aspects on the same level of guilt.

One of the best means of approaching this quantification of suffering was offered by the Israelis and Germans in their preparation agreement. An agreement that included pensions calculated according to inflation across the years, estimation of real estates and other aspects of individual loss. A different set of agreements was concluded about translating into money, in the form of grants to the state of Israel, of the collective human loss. In his writings, the Palestinian activist, Salman Abu Sitta, has begun using this approach to estimate the real value of assets lost in the *Nakbah*.

The second chapter in this series dealt with the potential tribunals that could handle such litigation and lawsuits. It focused on Pinochet and Milosevic. It asked the question: should war crimes and other atrocities be the subject of international jurisdiction or domestic jurisdiction? The third chapter entitled 'Nation Building: Moving beyond Injustice' dealt with atrocities committed by regimes in transition periods between occupation and liberation. The fourth chapter pondered the right of international intervention in local conflicts in the wake of evidence on atrocities or crimes. It worried about US actions masquerading as international actions thus exploiting such situations.

Now, let us imagine legal experts of collective crimes introducing the Palestinian *Nakbah* among the case studies of ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Chile as the subject for discussing the procedures necessary for the rectification of past evils. There are today Jews in Israel who are willing to watch such programmes, but they are undoubtedly a significant minority, even if they are larger in numbers than ever before.

The reason these people are a minority lies in the persistent power Zionist ideology still has on the Jewish public in Israel. This ideology, preached from kindergarten to school, produced a very pious self-image about Zionist morality and Palestinian immorality. Its level of sophistication varies according to education, socio-economic status and function. But its overall message does not. In the Israeli society, overt support by Jews for the Right of Return for Palestinians; for a Truth commission on the *Nakbah*; or for the trial of Israelis for war crimes committed in 1948 are instances that cannot be legitimized or accepted as part of everyday knowledge. Accordingly, and as Foucault argues in another context, advocates of such unpopular positions, which challenge a majority stronghold over what is admissible into the public realm, are assessed as ideologically deviant or mentally ill.

But maybe this is asking too much. And yet it is difficult to find non-retributive paradigms of justice. The Rwandan author, Babu Aynido, in his article 'Retribution or Restoration for Rwanda', published in January 1998 in the journal *Africanews*, dealt with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and elaborated upon one possible strategy for achieving justice:

> Suffice it to say that the retributive understanding of crime and justice, upon which the ICTR is founded, is discordant with the world view of many African communities. To emphasize retribution is the surest way to poison the seeds of reconciliation. If anything, retribution turns offenders into heroes, re-victimizes the victims and fertilizes the circle of violence.

Ayindo, here is inspired by Howard Zher's book, *Changing Lenses*,[14] in which he is strongly against the pro-punishment judicial system. One of the questions Zher raises and that is picked up by Ayindo in his discussion of the Rwandan case is relevant to our contemplation of the means by which Jews in Israel could overcome their fear of facing the past. He asks, should justice focus on establishing guilt or should it focus on identifying needs and obligations? In other words, can it serve as a re-regulator of life where life was once disrupted? Ayindo states clearly that Justice cannot be made to inflict suffering on victimizers, let alone their descendants, but to cease suffering from continuing. This claim that Zher considers revolutionary, explains Ayindo, is easily understood by many people in Africa, as the only reasonable way of dealing with victimhood. Even if one cannot compare between the genocide committed in Rwanda to the crime of 1948 Palestine, and its continued aftereffects, the mechanism of reconciliation itself is relevant.

Ayindo distinguishes between two models in this context: the tribunal in Rwanda which deals only with the past, and does not enable a reconstruction of relationships there, and the truth committee of Bishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa, which

he prefers, because it pays attention to the future. The power underlying the Truth commission, according to Ayindo, lies both in its disinclination to inflict heavy penalties, and in its insistence on discussing future relationships between different communities in South Africa. In contrast, the first model, the Rwanda tribunal, is the fastest and surest way of turning the victims into victimizers themselves.

A second way of overcoming this fear to face the past is offered by the American psychologist Joan Fumia, whose work focuses on the transformation of attitudes in conflictual situations.[15] She bases her work on the relationships which develop between offenders and victims in the American legal system, based on a recently introduced new procedure, which offers victim-offender mediation. This method involves a face-to-face meeting between offender and victim (obviously unsuitable for murder cases and thus not appropriate for genocidal cases but rather more adaptable to the Palestine case). However, the most important part of the procedure is the readiness of the offender to accept responsibility for his acts. Thus, the deed itself is not the focus of the process but its consequences. The search in this method is for restorative justice, defined as a question of what can the offender do to ease the loss and suffering of the victim. It is not a substitute for the criminal proceedings nor, in the case of Palestine, an alternative to actual compensation or repatriation but a supplement to any final solution. Fumia claimed that in South Africa, this model was successfully implemented.

Israeli responsibility for the *Nakbah*, if it were to be discussed, which at the present stage is unlikely, as part of the attempt to reach a permanent settlement for the conflict, would obviously not reach the international court, as did the cases of Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia. At least, this is what one can assess given the way the *Nakbah* is perceived by governments in the United States, Canada and Europe. These political actors have so far accepted the Israeli peace camp perspective on the conflict, as elaborated above. However, governments in Africa and Asia have different views on this, and the situation may change. But as long as this balance of power remains as it is now, one doubts the possibility of establishing a truth commission à la South Africa. But the demands of the 1948 Palestinian victims would remain in a very dominant position on the peace agenda, whether or not this procedure is followed. This outcry would continue to face the offenders. Moreover, the fear of the offender would have to be taken into account in order that the settlement of the conflict can move from the division of the visible to the restoration of the invisible.

The third route that could be possible has already been hinted at, in the beginning of this chapter. This would include the need for a dialectical recognition of both communities as communities of suffering; the demand that Israel recognize its role in the *Nakbah* can be accompanied by a parallel request that the Palestinians show their understanding of the importance of Holocaust memory for the Jewish community in Israel. This dialectical connection has already begun by Edward Said:

> What Israel does to the Palestinians it does against a background, not only of the long-standing Western tutelage over Palestine and Arabs … but also against a background of an equally long-standing and equally unfaltering anti-Semitism

> that in this century produced the Holocaust of the European Jews … We cannot fail to connect the horrific history of anti-Semitic massacres to the establishment of Israel; nor can we fail to understand the depth, the extent and the overpowering legacy of its suffering and despair that informed the postwar Zionist movement. But it is no less appropriate for Europeans and Americans today, who support Israel because of the wrong committed against the Jews to realize that support for Israel has included, and still includes, support for the exile and dispossession of the Palestinian people.[16]

The universalization of the Holocaust memory; the deconstruction of this memory's manipulation by Zionism and the state of Israel; and the end of Holocaust denial and underrating on the Palestinian side can lead to the mutual sympathy Said talks about.[17]

However, it may need more than this to convince the Israelis to recognize their role as victimizers. From the start, the self-image of the victim has been, and continues to be, deeply rooted in the collective conduct of the political elite in Israel. It is seen as the source for moral international and world Jewish support for the state, even when this image of the righteous Israel on the one hand and the David and Goliath myth on the other became quite ridiculous after the 1967 war, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and more recently the *intifada*. And yet the fear of losing the position of the victim, remains closely intertwined with the fear of facing the unpleasant past and its consequences. This is further compounded by the fear of being physically eliminated as a community, consistently nourished by the political system and substantiated by Arab hostility.

Israel's nuclear arsenal, its gigantic military complex, its security service octopuses, have all proved themselves useless in the face of the two *intifadas,* the guerrilla war in south Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. They are useless as means of facing an ever frustrated and radical million and a quarter Palestinian citizens of Israel or the local initiatives of refugees unable to contain their dismay in the face of an opportunist Palestinian Authority and a crumbling PLO. None of the weapons, nor the real or imaginary fears that have been produced, can face the victim and his or her wrath. More and more victims are added daily to the Palestinian community of suffering, in the occupied territories – in Israel itself and in south Lebanon. The end of victimization, with all its political implications, the admission of the Other into a national discourse and the recognition of the role of Israel as victimizer are the only useful means of reconciliation.

## Notes

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2 Ella Shohat, '*Mizrahim* in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims', *Theory, Culture & Ideology* Vol. 19, No. 20 (1988), pp. 1–35.

3 Ilan Pappe, 'Post-Zionist Critique: Part I: The Academic Debate', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 262 (Winter 1997), pp. 29–41.
4 Ilan Pappe, 'Israeli Television Fiftieth Anniversary Series: Tekumma: A Post-Zionist Review?', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 99–105.
5 Noam Chomsky, *Powers and Prospects*, London: Pluto Press, 1996, pp. 159–201.
6 Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, New York: Knopf, 1999.
7 Ilan Pappe, 'Post-Zionist Critique: Part III: Popular Culture', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 264 (Summer 1997), pp. 60–69.
8 See for example the ways on which Holocaust Memorials have been used to constitute collective memory as well as advance particular political ends in James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.
9 This concept was first developed in Elizabeth Fau, *Community of Suffering and Struggle, Women, Men and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915–1945*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).
10 See the articles in Bo Sarth, ed., *Memory and Myth in the Construction of Community*, Florence: European University Institute, 1999.
11 Ilan Pappe, 'Were They Expelled?: The History, Historiography and Relevance of the Refugee Problem', in Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cortran, eds., *The Palestinian Exodus, 1948–1988*, London: Ithaca, 1999, pp. 37–62.
12 Teddy Katz was interviewed in *Maariv*, together with Asa Kasher and others, on 21 January 2000; more details can be found in the news section of www.Arabia.com.
13 Ilan Pappe, 'Breaking the Mirror: Oslo and After', in Haim Gordon, ed., *Looking Back at the June 1967 War*, Westport: Prager, 1999, pp. 95–112.
14 Howard Zehr, *Changing Lenses; A New Focus for Crime and Justice*, Ontario: Herald Press, 1990.
15 Joan Fumia, 'Restitution versus Retribution: The Case for Victim-Offender Mediation, Conflict Resolution', *Suite101.com*, published for the first time in October 1988, reporting the Victim-Offender Program (VORP) at work in US legal system.
16 Edward Said, The *Politics of Dispossession*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1994, p. 167.
17 Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1999; Norman Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry, Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering*, London: Verso Books, 2000.